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The “Vast Wasteland” in Retrospect 
Joel Rosenbloom* 
First, a disclosure: I was a newly minted legal assistant to Newton 
Minow in May 1961, when the speech was given.1 I and several other staff 
members had sought to persuade him to drop the “vast wasteland” phrase. I 
thought it was too intellectual—the broadcasters would hate the speech in 
any case and the wider public whose support Minow sought would not get 
the reference to the Eliot poem. Minow first agreed, and then at his wife’s 
urging, put the phrase back in. The subsequent public reaction—which 
made the “vast wasteland” phrase famous—put paid to any pretensions I 
might have had to expertise in public relations. 
Whatever I thought of its language, however, I was a committed 
supporter of the speech’s substance, including its central demand that 
commercial telecasters provide programming that was socially worthy but 
undervalued by the commercial market. Yet today the speech reads like the 
relic of a bygone geologic age. This Essay attempts to explain why this 
should be so. 
It is not, to begin with, that the intellectual bases for Minow’s activist 
stance toward broadcast program regulation have been decisively refuted. 
Consider the thesis that activist program regulation is warranted by the 
scarcity of broadcast frequencies; i.e., that the government may or must 
allocate limited frequencies to different uses, and that it cannot in so doing 
avoid responsibility for the social worth of the uses (as well as the users) 
that it licenses.2 Even before 1961, this claim had been attacked by Ronald 
 
* Of counsel, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C. 
 1. Newton N. Minow, Television and the Public Interest, Speech Before the National 
Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961) [hereinafter Vast Wasteland Speech]. 
 2. This thesis did not appear in the 1961 speech itself. See id. It soon appeared, 
however, in a speech to the Conference on Freedom and Responsibility in Broadcasting at 
Northwestern University on August 3, 1961, in which Minow defended his stance on 
broadcast regulation against charges that he was violating First Amendment freedoms. See 
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Coase, in a now-famous article which demonstrated that the 
electromagnetic spectrum is no more limited than any other economic 
resource; that the government could in principle define property rights in 
the use of the spectrum, auction them off (or dispose of them to private 
parties by lottery or some other means), and let them be, thereafter, 
allocated to different uses and users by the forces of the market.3 Since 
1961, it has become commonplace for scholars and jurists to treat that 
demonstration as a total refutation of the claim that “frequency scarcity” 
justifies the regulation of broadcast program content.4 But the conclusion 
does not follow automatically from the premise. 
Clearly, if frequency allocation and use were determined solely by 
property rights and market forces, no one could point to “frequency 
scarcity” as a reason that the government may or must assume 
responsibility for broadcast program content.5 But while Federal 
Communication Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) broadcast licenses 
have many of the features of de facto property rights,6 the government has 
continued to determine the allocation and use of broadcast frequencies, and 
there is no likelihood that this situation will change anytime soon. 
It does not matter whether one ascribes the persistence of the 
government allocation model to a general perception of its superior merit,7 
 
NEWTON N. MINOW, EQUAL TIME: THE PRIVATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
72, 77-85 (Lawrence Laurent ed., 1964). 
 3. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 12-
27 (1959) [hereinafter Coase 1959]. See also R.H. Coase, The Interdepartment Radio 
Advisory Committee, 5 J.L. & ECON. 17 (1962). 
 4. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638 n.5 (1994) (citing Telecomms. 
Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 
U.S. 919 (1987)); LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 87-90 (1991); LUCAS A. 
POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 197-209 (1987); 
MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 7-18 (1986); Note, The 
Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1072-74 (1994); Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends—Part I: 
Why Can’t Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 218-40 (1986). See 
also Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 905, 908-11 (1997). 
 5. The same would be true if problems of scarcity could be overcome through new 
technology and the spectrum could be treated as a “commons” to which anyone might have 
access. See, e.g., Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 
2002 STAN. TECH L. REV. 2, at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/02_STLR_2. 
 6. See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter W. Huber, Administrative Creation of Property 
Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON. 581 (1998). The basic observation is not new. 
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-15 (1972); Coase 1959, supra 
note 3, at 22-23. 
 7. See, e.g., FCC, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT (ET Dkt. No. 02-135) (Nov. 
2002), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1.pdf. While 
generally urging a move toward spectrum allocation via property rights and market forces 
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or to an unholy (if tacit) alliance among rent-seeking broadcasters, 
politicians, and bureaucrats.8 So long as we continue to base broadcast 
frequency allocations on government judgments of the “public interest” to 
be served, the argument that those judgments may or must consider 
broadcast program content will remain viable. That we could deal with 
broadcast frequency scarcity in some other fashion does not warrant 
reasoning as if we were already doing so. 
The “frequency scarcity” thesis has been strengthened, moreover, by 
the current vogue for its kissing cousin—the belief that “the public owns 
the airwaves.”9 Ironically, in 1961, the “public ownership” thesis was little 
more than a rhetorical flourish with no independent power to turn the crank 
of legal analysis.10 Section 304 of the Communications Act, which was 
derived from the Radio Act of 1927, provided then (as it does now) that 
license applicants must waive any right to the spectrum “as against the 
regulatory power of the United States.”11 That choice of language was 
deliberately intended to foreclose any claim that the government owns the 
spectrum as it does public lands.12 In 1993, however, Congress authorized 
 
(or, in some cases, via a “commons” approach), this FCC staff report recommends that “for 
the time being” the traditional “command-and-control” model continue to be applied to 
broadcasting, on the ground that the market cannot be relied upon to produce a variety of 
“public interest” benefits (including sufficient socially desirable programming—e.g., 
children’s education—and sufficient restraints on socially undesirable programming—e.g., 
indecent broadcasts). Id. at 44-45. 
 8. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why 
Did FCC Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1998). 
 9. The “Vast Wasteland” speech relied heavily on this belief: “First: the people own 
the air. They own it as much in prime evening time as they do at 6 o’clock Sunday morning. 
For every hour that the people give you, you owe them something. I intend to see that your 
debt is paid with service.” Vast Wasteland Speech, supra note 1. 
 10. The plurality opinion in CBS v. Democratic National Committee exemplifies this 
usage. CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). It said that “the use of a public 
resource by the broadcast media permits a limited degree of Government surveillance.” Id. 
at 126. But “the thesis . . . that broadcast licensees are granted use of part of the public 
domain” did not “resolve the sensitive constitutional issues inherent in deciding whether a 
particular licensee action is subject to First Amendment restraints.” Id. at 115. 
 11. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 304, 48 Stat. 1064, 1083 (current version 
at 47 U.S.C. § 304 (2000)). 
 12. The Conference Committee on the 1927 legislation had substituted the waiver “as 
against the regulatory power of the United States” for the Senate bill’s requirement of a 
waiver “as against the United States.” The Act’s co-author, Senator Dill, defended this 
change by stressing that “[t]he Government does not own the frequencies, as we call them, 
or the use of frequencies. It only possesses the right to regulate the apparatus, and that right 
is obtained from the provision of the Constitution which gives Congress the power to 
regulate interstate commerce.” 68 CONG. REC. S2870 (Feb. 3, 1927). See also id. at S2872 
(“We might declare that we own all the channels, but we do not.”); id. at S2874. 
Either the term “United States” means only the regulatory power under the 
Constitution, or else it means a right which the Constitution does not give us to 
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the FCC, for the first time, to distribute licenses (limited to specified non-
broadcast services) by means of auctions.13 In so doing, it required the 
agency to seek (among other things) the “recovery for the public of a 
portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made available for 
commercial use.”14 The legislative history, moreover, refers to the spectrum 
as a “public” or “national” resource, from the use of which the government 
is entitled to recover an economic return.15 
Advocates of program regulation soon argued that, because 
broadcasters use “the public’s” spectrum “for nothing,” the government, as 
representative of the public, has the right to demand payment in service to 
public ends the government specifies.16 And the FCC—in an action that 
was the high-water mark of the kind of program regulation that Minow 
espoused—justified rules that effectively require commercial television 
stations to devote three hours each week to children’s educational and 
informational programs on grounds of both “frequency scarcity” and 
“public ownership.”17 
I repeat, therefore, that Minow’s approach has not been decisively 
discredited.18 Why does it nonetheless seem antique? I can suggest several 
reasons. 
 
 
ask them to waive. There is no power to control radio stations except the power to 
regulate. The power to regulate is not the power to own. 
Id. Senator Watson, Chairman of the Senate Committee, was equally emphatic: 
The Government undertakes to regulate it, I will say to the Senator, as he is well 
aware, only by reason of the fact that it is interstate commerce. We do not own the 
railroads but we regulate them. We do not own the ether but we control the right 
to the use of that ether. That is all that we seek to control. 
Id. at S2872. 
 13. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2000). 
 14. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(C). 
 15. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 248-49, 253 (1993). 
 16. See, e.g., Reed Hundt & Karen Kornbluh, Renewing the Deal Between Broadcasters 
and the Public: Requiring Clear Rules for Children’s Educational Television, 9 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 11, 21-22 (1996). 
 17. See Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s TV Programming, Report and Order, 
11 F.C.C.R. 10660 para. 149, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1385 (1996). 
 18. Senator John McCain recently introduced a bill that would, among other things: 
establish commercial broadcasting station minimum airtime requirements for 
candidate-centered and issue-centered programming before primary and general 
elections . . . . This legislation builds on the long history of requiring broadcasters 
to serve the public interest in exchange for the privilege of obtaining an exclusive 
license to use a scarce public resource: the electromagnetic spectrum. The burden 
imposed on broadcasters pales in comparison to the enormous value of this 
spectrum, which recent estimates suggest is worth as much as $367 billion. 
148 CONG. REC. S10,583 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002). 
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First, the 1962 all-channel receiver legislation, which required that 
television sets be capable of receiving UHF television signals,19 and the 
growth of cable television, which tended to equalize the ease of reception 
for UHF and VHF television stations,20 made UHF stations viable (albeit 
not the equal of VHF stations). The result was an enormous growth in the 
number of both commercial and noncommercial public television 
stations.21 The existence of a nationwide, functioning public television 
service, which provides many of the programs Minow demanded of 
commercial telecasters, unavoidably makes those demands seem less 
urgent. 
The growth of cable has had another relevant effect. We now have, in 
addition to six general-audience television broadcast networks and several 
Spanish-language networks, a wide variety of television networks that 
depend entirely on non-broadcast, cable transmissions and derive support 
from subscription payments as well as advertising. Some of the cable 
networks provide the kind of educational, cultural, and other programs that 
Minow demanded. None of the cable networks is constrained by 
“frequency scarcity.” This does not refute the “frequency scarcity” thesis as 
applied to broadcasters, but it once again reduces its significance—why 
should we care so much whether commercial broadcasters provide the 
desired service? And it creates a disparity between the regulation of 
broadcasters and cable services, which although not inexplicable, is 
certainly awkward. 
Second, the general movement for deregulation of American industry, 
which arose during the Ford administration and reached its acme in the 
Reagan and first Bush administrations,22 had a major impact on FCC 
program regulation. Traditional efforts to require “public interest” 
programming in the context of license renewal were swept aside or diluted 
virtually to the point of insignificance, on the ground that they were no 
longer necessary to achieve “public interest” goals.23 
 
 19. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (2000). 
 20. See BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 214-215 (1992). 
 21. The growth of public television was also plainly helped by the institution of major 
federal funding, as well as by the advent of a VHF public station serving the New York 
metropolitan area—a development for which the Minow FCC could claim some credit. See 
Roy R. Russo, Public Broadcasting, in THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE MAJOR AMENDMENTS, 1934-1996, 147-64 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1999); NTA 
TV Brdcst. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 44 F.C.C. 2563 (1961). 
 22. See generally MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF 
DEREGULATION (1985). 
 23. See Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 49 Rad. Reg.2d (P 
& F) 1 (1981), aff’d in part and remanded in part, United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 
F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Revision of the Applications for Renewal of License and 
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Similarly, the “fairness doctrine” had for decades required 
broadcasters to provide some programming devoted to controversial issues 
of public importance and, in so doing, it allowed for a reasonable 
opportunity for the presentation of conflicting views. Although the 
constitutionality of the doctrine had been affirmed in ringing terms (on 
“frequency scarcity” grounds) by Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. 
FCC,24 the FCC now found the “frequency scarcity” thesis invalid and the 
doctrine both unconstitutional and contrary to the public interest. On 
review, the D.C. Circuit chose not to address Red Lion but found the FCC’s 
public-interest rationale independent of the Constitution and affirmed on 
that ground.25 
As noted above, the “frequency scarcity” thesis survived this blow 
and, in conjunction with the “public property” theory, returned to justify 
the current rule on children’s television programming. But the Clinton 
FCC, which adopted that rule, made no attempt to revive the “fairness 
doctrine” or any serious attempt to reinstate a vigorous practice of requiring 
“public interest” programming generally in the context of license renewal. 
It seems highly unlikely that any such efforts will be made in the 
future. For the reasons already described, it no longer matters as much 
whether commercial television broadcasting is or is not a “vast wasteland.”  
 
 
 
Commercial and Noncommercial AM, FM, and Television Licensees, 49 Rad. Reg.2d (P & 
F) 740 (1981), recon. denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 1127, 50 Rad. 
Reg.2d (P & F) 704 (1981), aff’d, Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407 
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment 
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial TV Stations, Report and 
Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1005 (1984), recon. denied, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358, 60 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 526 (1986), 
aff’d in part and remanded in part, Action for Children’s TV v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). In the “Vast Wasteland” speech, Minow had promised to make license renewal 
the focus of his efforts to reclaim the “wasteland.” Vast Wasteland Speech, supra note 1. 
 24. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 25. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1019 (1990). The rationale that the court affirmed was (1) that the overwhelming 
number of broadcast and non-broadcast television outlets made it unnecessary to impose the 
doctrine on individual broadcasters in order to provide the public with access to conflicting 
views on public issues; (2) that the doctrine had operated to discourage broadcasters from 
presenting controversial programming; and (3) that, by involving the government in close 
supervision of broadcaster editorial judgments about the coverage of issues, the doctrine had 
created opportunities for serious abuse of power. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d 656. 
See FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 32–
35 (1975) (asserting that the complainant whose claims were upheld in Red Lion was acting 
at the behest of the Democratic National Committee, some of whose officials sought to 
employ “fairness” complaints to discourage right-wing assaults on the Kennedy 
administration over radio or television). 
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Moreover, even those who (like me) believed in Minow’s attempt to reform 
the “wasteland” no longer have confidence in the efficacy or the wisdom of 
the attempt to achieve that result by regulation. 
As to efficacy, it suffices to cite the first-year law students’ favorite, 
Lumley v. Gye.26 Courts cannot make opera singers sing, and administrative 
agencies cannot make commercial broadcasters provide unprofitable 
cultural, educational, or informational programming that is creative and 
effective. The FCC rule requiring minimum amounts of children’s 
educational and informational programming has undoubtedly increased the 
quantity of programming shown on the tube that meets the only kind of 
standard an administrative agency can enforce. But one doubts that there 
has been a major change in the degree to which the commercial medium 
performs the desired function effectively. 
As to wisdom, the regulatory model based on “frequency scarcity” 
and “public ownership of the spectrum” has always had a repressive 
potential. Justice Brennan (among others) argued that “frequency scarcity” 
can justify only affirmative content requirements, not prohibitions or 
restrictions.27 But if the government is responsible for the failure of 
broadcasters to provide socially desirable content, it is hard to see why it is 
not responsible for their provision of socially undesirable content. 
Well before Minow, the FCC had acted on this supposition. It had 
taken action, for example, against what it regarded as news “distortion” or 
“slanting” by a broadcaster hostile to the incumbent Democratic 
administration.28 The social and political convulsions of the 1960s and 
1970s resulted in serious FCC investigations and admonitions about news 
“staging” or distortion in the coverage of marijuana smoking by college 
students, poverty in the South, the riots at the 1958 Democratic National 
Convention, and the public relations activities of the Defense Department.29 
 
 26. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). 
 27. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 770 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 28. See KMPC, Station of the Stars, Inc., Order Designating Application for Hearing, 
14 Fed. Reg. 4831 (Aug. 2, 1949); G.A. Richards, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 
F.C.C. 429, 5 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1292 (1950) (hearing on whether to renew the licenses of a 
radio broadcaster who allegedly ordered the slanting of news in a manner hostile to those he 
disfavored, including prominent Democrats). 
 29. See WBBM-TV, Order Instituting Inquiry and Investigation, 33 Fed. Reg. 5058 
(Mar. 1968); Inquiry into WBBM-TV’s Brdcst. on Nov. 1 and 2, 1967, of a Report on a 
Marihuana Party, Report, 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 16 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 207 (1969); Network 
Coverage of the Democratic Nat’l Convention, Letter, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 15 Rad. Reg.2d (P 
& F) 791 (1969); CBS Program “Hunger in America,” Memorandum Opinion, 20 F.C.C.2d 
143, 17 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 674 (1969); CBS Program “The Selling of the Pentagon,” 
Letter, 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 21 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 912 (1971). 
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The FCC, to its credit, stopped well short of the punishment demanded by 
the industry’s critics and sought to limit its intervention to cases where 
“extrinsic evidence” demonstrated deliberate distortion. The chilling effect, 
however, was unmistakable. And those precedents remain “good law.”30 
Similarly, although not reflected in the “Vast Wasteland” speech, 
Minow’s approach to FCC program regulation encompassed an assault on 
broadcast smut. In Palmetto Broadcasting Co., the FCC denied license 
renewal for a radio station upon the ground, among others, that the station’s 
premier disk jockey repeatedly made remarks that were “coarse, vulgar, 
and suggestive material susceptible of indecent double meaning[s].”31 This 
finding was based, not on the statutory prohibition of obscene or indecent 
broadcasts, but on the “public interest” standard for broadcast licensing.32 
Subsequently, the FCC has based its attempt to regulate broadcast 
pornography primarily on this statutory provision and has been upheld 
mainly because of the “pervasiveness” of the broadcast medium—a ground 
that is independent of the “frequency scarcity” and “public ownership” 
theses.33 But the broader “public interest” approach has never been 
repudiated. In the 1970s, when there was serious public pressure to do 
something, not merely about pornography, but more broadly about “sex 
and violence” on television, the FCC threatened to use the “public interest” 
approach in order to secure broadcaster compliance with its desire for an 
early evening “family viewing hour.”34 
The dangers of these repressions of broadcast speech pale in 
comparison with the famous instance in which President Nixon entertained 
the idea of punishing the The Washington Post for its coverage of the 
Watergate scandal by threatening its license for its Miami television 
 
 30. See, e.g., Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1216-24 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 31. Palmetto Brdcst. Co. (WDKD), Decision, 33 F.C.C. 250, para. 4 (1962), recon. 
denied, 35 F.C.C. 101 (1963), aff’d sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964). 
 32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). The Minow FCC was aware that this decision tread 
on constitutionally dangerous ground. License renewal was also denied on the formally 
independent ground that the licensee had engaged in deliberate misrepresentations to the 
FCC, and the decision was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit on the latter ground alone. 
Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam). 
 33. See Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 32 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1331 (1975), on 
recon., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 36 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1008 
(1976), aff’d sub nom FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The independence of 
the “pervasiveness” rationale was demonstrated by Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, which applied that rationale to cable television. 518 U.S. 727 
(1996). 
 34. See Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), 
vacated, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979). 
ROSENBLOOM-FINAL 4/21/2003  4:32 PM 
Number 3] IN RETROSPECT 579 
station—an episode that was followed shortly by the filing of an 
application for the Post’s Miami television facilities by a group including at 
least one close Nixon friend.35 The all-but-standardless FCC process then 
used to deal with competing broadcast applications would have made it 
easy for a Nixon-dominated FCC to punish the Post without any overt 
intervention in broadcast (or newspaper) content. But that process (as 
applied to incumbent broadcaster license renewals) was virtually 
eliminated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.36 The dangers inherent 
in Minow’s approach remain. 
In short, the “Vast Wasteland” speech reads like a relic because it is a 
relic—the product of a very different time.37 It can be usefully excavated 
and analyzed, but one would not like to see it come to life today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35. See Watergate Tape Points to White House Complicity in Challenges to Post-
Newsweek, BRDCST., May 20, 1974, at 25. 
 36. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (2000). 
 37. Other 1961 supporters have long since recanted. See, e.g., Henry Geller, Public 
Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341 (1998). 
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